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HOW HONDURAS BUILT AN INFRASTRUCTURE CATASTROPHE By: Lorenzo Dee Belveal Hurricane "Mitch" that punished Honduras for most of a week was most certainly an "act of God" that will never be forgotten. But the infrastructure disaster that has ensued is no accident. Quite the contrary, the collapse of virtually all of the bridges, inactivation of several airports, and hundreds of miles of Honduras roads, are a clear and obvious result of shabby construction, skimping on materials specifications, looting and "skimming" construction project funds. Had the funds budgeted for the various construction jobs been properly used, they would have produced bridges and highways that would have held up under the rains that "Mitch" brought. Honduras has been adjudged one of the most corrupt nations on this earth, by no less an authority than "Transparency International", which in its 1998 report, lists only Patagonia and Cameroon as being more corrupt. Hurricane "Mitch" offers extensive and grim confirmation of that shameful judgement. Speaking out of more than thirty years of experience in Central America, as a correspondent, investor, and economic consultant, I nominate bridge, highway, and other infrastructure construction projects as the prime source for the "illicit enrichment" that has been the hallmark of Honduras political administration for many decades. While Honduras is a perennial supplicant for United States AID and low- or no-interest "loans", it has steadfastly insisted on getting the money "without strings attached". Politicians make the case that, while accepting foreign funds is not below their national pride, to accept "foreign" supervision of the expenditures of those "special" loans, grants-in-aid, etc., constitutes an affront to Honduran sovereignty. In accommodating to the sensitivities of Honduras "sovereignty", this is the way the system usually works: A bridge, an airport, or a stretch of highway, is promoted through the bureaucratic structure, with the result that AID, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or some other money source agrees to furnish the requisite funds. An engineering design is prepared, engineering specifications are formalized and set forth, from which a financial estimate and budget can be made. Then both Honduras and the United States (or another trusting donor) signs-off on the project, which includes the engineering details, financial program, and timetable for completion. So far, so good. The trouble starts when the construction begins. Honduras wants the money, and complete control of construction details, which means final say on all engineering considerations . Honduran officials want no "foreign" engineers looking over their shoulders, and inspecting the work as it progresses. To accept this kind of engineering supervision (even from the entity that is providing the money to do the work) constitutes some kind of intolerable affront to Honduran pride. Like the plaint of a petulant child, the message is loud and clear, "Lender, (or donor) we would rather do it ourselves!" It usually becomes quickly apparent to an experienced observer that, while the entity which is providing the money is spurely interested in building a bridge that will last for 30, or 40 years, the Hondurans have a different view of what constitutes success. The Honduran constructors are looking for every opportunity to skimp, short-cut, and otherwise hold back funds from the "design price". The reason is clear: Whatever dollars they can divert from the construction project, will be available to pass out among the politicians who are due a "piece of the pie". The "skimmed" money shortage is covered by inflated invoices, totally phony charges for imaginary services rendered, and other scams of various kinds. The devices by which construction funds can be diverted from the work involved, are as various as the people who carry them out are imaginative. Quality in construction depends on such crucial details as the proportions of portland cement, gravel, sand and additives in the "mix". Since sand and gravel is much cheaper than cement, skimping on cement and increasing sand and gravel components can save a good bit of money per cubic yard of mixed concrete. Money thus diverted will be available to divide between the corrupt constructors and their political co-conspirators. Another favorite area for cost-cutting involves reinforcing iron, usually referred to as "re-bar". Engineering specifications regularly call for reinforcing bars to be wired and tied inside the cement forms in specified shapes and locations. For example, the "specs" may call for "6-inch boxes, made of 5/8" reinforcing iron bars", as the skeleton for the piers, abutments, and joints in a highway bridge. By substituting ½" or 3/8" bar for the ½", and making 9" or 10" boxes, instead of the specified 6-inch box forms, a lot of dollars can be "skimmed" off the "design budget". There are almost innumerable opportunities for short-cutting the project and diverting the "saved" money to the benefit of crooked constructors and politicians. It largely depends on the cupidity and avarice of the constructors doing the job. A favorite place for cheating on bridges is in the so-called "covered work". Piers, abutments and underground caissons are crucial to building a reliable bridge in Honduras. The agricultural areas especially, have a sandy loam that - unless firmly anchored and skirted - will not resist erosion and excessive washing during run-offs of storm water. This is common knowledge on the part of engineers who know little else! But this is precisely the area in which Honduras bridges are short-changed, in the interests of diverting money for political payoffs. Stark evidence of the truth of this charge lies in arroyos and river-beds all over Honduras. No less an authority than El Presidente Carlos Roberto Flores Facusse, has been widely quoted in the press, to the effect that seventy-percent (70%) of all of Honduras bridges have succumbed to the deluge brought by Hurricane "Mitch". It is not surprising that a few bridges would have failed in the face of such an historic deluge, but that seven out of every ten bridges in the Republica would have broken down or washed out their positions is patently excessive. Something beyond the irresistible forces of nature must be involved. And it is. Corrupt political interests have been skimming Honduras construction allocations for more than thirty-five years that I personally know about. Anyone who want to confirm this need only go look at the evidence "Mitch" has left in the wake of it flood of almost biblical proportions. A bridge built in the form of a rectangle without lateral and vertical underground structural extensions to anchor the form into the earth and prevent the water passing through or under it, thus cutting it loose from its position, will likely function quite satisfactorily in dry weather. It is equally predictable that it will fail in the face of flooding. This is the story of Honduras bridges. That an estimated seventy percent (70%) of them failed in the face of "Mitch’s" rains is not surprising. Any competent engineer who examines the bridge artifacts that Mitch has left behind will have no difficulty fixing the reason: Most of the structures were deliberately and seriously sabotaged in construction, in the interests of diverting a major portion of the construction budget into political pockets. Now all of these failed bridges, highways, and related infrastructure elements must be replaced. Predictably, unless firm procedures are installed to prevent it, the same corrupt processes will take place once more. Honduras will energetically resist "outside" supervision of construction for a single obvious, if covert, reason: Unless the Hondurans can get control of both the project funds and the construction itself, they will not be able to "skim" the budgets, shortchange the work, enrich the political bosses - and create another potential catastrophe, just like the one that is presently being contemplated. Whether attributable to inability to build properly, or unwillingness to conform to accepted engineering standards and specified materials and methods, Honduras owns the greatest collection of sub-standard, failed or failing, bridges, airports, highways and related installations to be found in all of Central America. The problems are not the result of building "on the cheap". Most of these jobs were more than adequately budgeted. When being paid for by the United States government, especially, only the sky tends to be the limit. The problem, at the risk of offensive repetition, is that a large share of the funds never get to the project(s). Any well-intentioned donor, whether governmental, non-governmental, corporate or private, who intends to help Honduras replace its demolished infrastructure, should begin with a firm resolve to never take their eyes off the projects involved. On the basis of decades of consistent evidence, the donors of the funds may be motivated by the noblest objectives and interests. They may spend with the most lavish of hands. But the more money available, without gimlet-eyed supervision, the more money there is to divert and steal. To some, these remarks will be adjudged excessively suspicious and mean-spirited. In defense of them, I will say again, go look at the remains of the gerry-built, failed bridge wreckage in the watercourses throughout Honduras. Convince yourself. Then realize that, unless iron-fisted requirements are installed to prevent it, those engineering absurdities will be replaced by the same kind of work - and for the same reasons. Nothing could have stopped "Mitch" but the hand of God. The wind and rain was bad enough. However, had some sensible construction supervision come along with the hundreds of millions of dollars involved, Honduras could still have a great many serviceable or repairable bridges, roads, airports, and related commercial facilities -- Instead of having to begin again, from Square-One. Shamefully, this part of the tragedy is man-made. -------------------------- ========================================================
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