What really happened on  Sunday,  November 30?

By: Lorenzo Dee Belveal

If one takes the stories in the international news media at face value, November 30, 1997, marked the fifth time in a row that Honduras has passed governmental authority from one set of incumbent office-holders, on to their duly elected successors, without beefing up the ballots with bullets. This is certainly no small accomplishment, coming as it does on the heels of a century and one-half of variously-labeled, consecutive, Honduras dictatorships.

Perhaps the most auspicious aspect of the November 30, exercise was that - for the very first time - local elections ceased to be held hostage to the outcome of the recurrent struggle between the Nacionales and the Liberales. This is to say that, for the first time, if a voter was so inclined, he could vote for a "Red" presidential candidate and a "Blue" Alcalde.

As the numbers shape up, a lot of people did just exactly that. Witness especially, the impressive victory of "Blue" candidate El Gordito Cesar Castellanos, in winning the important post of Alcalde of Tegucigalpa, while "Red" candidate Carlos Flores was winning the Presidential Palace in the same city. This kind of anachronistic outcome can occur when voters have an opportunity to pick and choose among the names on the ballot.

A lot of locally defeated "Red" candidates are now blaming their failure to find approval at the polls on Don Carlos Flores. They are fully entitled to do so. Senor Flores might be a certifiable genius at running a newspaper, but it seems abundantly clear that he doesn’t understand the first thing about running a conventional election campaign - or wasn’t so inclined.

A key element in political campaigning is called the "coat-tail effect", and it’s the mother’s milk of ballot-box politics. What it means is that the best known, most popular "party standard-bearer" who occupies the spot at the head of the ticket, is expected to win his own race, and carry a lot of his like-minded party-labeled candidates into office with him. A candidate who does this successfully is said to have "long coat-tails." He ends up with lots of loyal (read: obligated) friends in high political positions. A candidate who can’t do this is said to have had "no coat-tails." He suffers throughout his term in office, by having political opponents - who won in spite of his efforts to defeat them - rather than friends who "rode his coat-tails" to election, filling the subordinate spots in his administrative structure. This sort of incumbent dichotomy doesn’t make for a happy political camp.

Bringing off "the coat-tail trick" calls for the Big Man to make lots of speeches in which he has all kinds of nice things to say about the lower ranked candidates who share the same political "ticket" with him. In addition to the verbal compliments, the Big Man is expected to make himself available to have his picture taken with dozens or hundreds of  candidates that ostensibly share his political faith and sense of mission.

In turn, having people of the same political stripe at all levels of  the government structure is usually urged on the voters as a means of facilitating federal/local functions, and thereby bringing improved services to the citizens, as a result of the "shared vision" and close agreement on what needs to be done.

The standard speech line goes like this: "I want you to vote for me, and I want you to vote for (insert a candidate name) too, because I am going to need his/her help to get my program working the way it should. So when you vote, vote for me - and vote for (candidate what’s-his-name)."

But Don Carlos wanted none of this political "one-hand-washes-the-other" business. He made it clear from the outset that he was in the presidential race by himself. He neither sought campaign support, nor offered it. This aloofness applied to everyone - even including Presidente Carlos Roberto Reina, whom he sought to succeed; and who, it must be presumed, was in a position to materially assist the Flores campaign effort.

This "go it alone" program was not the only campaign idiosyncracy   evidenced by Don Carlos Flores.

Although he owns and actively manages one of the most prestigious newspapers in Honduras, he refused to submit to a single interview for publication - neither in his own publication nor anyone else’s! The practicing politicians of my acquaintance – and I know a lot of them - would not only call this news "blackout" policy ill-advised, but palpably self-defeating.

Don Carlos may have held to this stance because he really didn’t know what to say, in which case saying nothing is usually the best policy. Or he may have refused to be interviewed because of his reticence to go "on the record" with plans and programs he intends to install as features of his new government, and that he felt would not be well-received by the voters. Or his silence might have just reflected a settled conviction that, while advertising is known to sell tomatoes, it doesn’t sell political candidates.

The reasons for his refusal to state his political case, or to outline his vision of Honduras as he would like to see it has never been clarified. Even the candidate’s own campaign staff were unable to explain his unbending aversion to publicity, and they were clearly - and vocally - in disagreement with it.

Whatever he did, however, and odd as it might have appeared to the eyes of more conventionally oriented politicians, both in his party and out of it, Don Carlos Flores Facusse did, indeed, win election to the highest office in the nation. That was his intention all along, and he accomplished it. Having won the prize, everything else is persiflage.

How he won it is not important, except as instructive material for future candidates who will one day seek to walk in his victorious footsteps.

Had he lost, the reverse would be equally true: Nobody would be the least bit interested in how he lost. This is the way elective politics has always worked. Winning is not just important. Winning is everything!

Granting this imperative, and it’s hard to see how anyone can mount a realistic argument against it, the political campaign just ended has to be written down as a strange piece of business, to be sure. There were no debates of issues that much exceeded the perimeters of a luncheon table or a meeting room. There were no presentations of "platforms" intended to inform the potential voters of the positions of the candidates seeking their approbation. Whatever conflicts that did happen to arise during the hustings overwhelmingly involved exchanges of personal diatribes, with the clear objective of character assassination, rather than mere vote-getting.

So what was the motivation for President-elect Carlos Flores Facusse’s steadfast refusal to mold himself to the party image, and make the usual "arrangements" with the Liberal Party bellwethers - including Don Carlos Roberto Reina, himself - who, it must be assumed, had it in their power to assist his run for the presidency? The guessing, in print and out of it, has run the gamut from aristocratic arrogance, to ignorance of "proper" political behavior. I would like to suggest a different   hypothesis.

Don Carlos Flores Facusse is a wealthy man.

He is not inclined to overt criminal activities, so he doesn’t need the legal immunity that automatically comes along with a political position in Honduras. Likewise, he presumably has no need for the long-established avenues of political corruption that are the hallmarks of Honduras political administration, and that exist to enable politicians to steal money.

Don Carlos already has money. Lots of money! Moreover, the money he has was earned by his family and by himself in respectable commercial activities. Perhaps he feels that he already has enough respectable money; in which case he may not feel much impelled to steal more.

If this premise is correct, then his standing aloof from the characteristic wheeling and dealing that has forever constituted Honduras political "business as usual",   was not and is not a decision that was taken lightly. In effect, his campaign comportment delivered a message that came through unmistakably loud and clear: ""A pox on both of your houses!" his actions declared.  "If I am to be President of Honduras, then it will have to be without restrictive ties to either the "Blue" or the "Red" political camps."

If the Honduras political process realistically accommodated the "Third Party" concept, then Don Carlos would likely have announced and ran as an "Independent." This would have greatly simplified his running of a "solo" election campaign.

But be all of this as it may, he is de facto, the first "independent" president Honduras has had for as long as election memories run. He is the first President, since the first Honduras "Strong Man" adopted the "Presidente" title to gussy up a military dictatorship, who has an opportunity to run an honest and respectable government, without the corrosive "party" ties that have consistently tied the hands of his predecessors. He is the first truly elected president of Honduras, who ostensibly will go into office without a cargo of accrued political obligations hemming in and foreclosing his administrative prerogatives on every side.   In political terms and  on the face of it,   Presidente-elect Carlos Flores Facusse doesn't owe anything to anyone for his political accomplishment.  He is his own man!

Because of this, he has a magnificent and heretofore unequaled opportunity to refurbish both the domestic fortunes and the international reputation of a country that has too long been held up as Exhibit #1 - the horrible example of consummate administrative ineptitude and unbridled political corruption.  And the sufferring of a nation that is so encumbered. 

As Don Carlos undertakes this daunting task, he richly deserves the loyal support of his friends, the studied forbearance of his political opposition, and the earnest prayers of everyone who cares a damn about  the future of Honduras. Seldom if ever has a heavier responsibility fallen on the shoulders of any man. The manner in which he discharges his obligations can change face and the fate of Honduras for all time to come.

There were some really hard-fought electoral contests taking place on Sunday, but they didn’t get much press attention. They were local, and they involved candidates earnestly seeking positions as Diputados, Alcaldes and other Departmental and Municipal offices. These contests never  make  big news stories.

Insofar as the "national ticket" was concerned, however, is was obvious almost from the outset of the campaign season, that neither of the two hands-down front runners, Nora Gunera de Melgar and Carlos Flores Facusse, had any intention of "campaigning’ for the presidency in the usual sense of that bare-knuckled, no-holds-barred term. They were both content to stand on their records, as the saying goes, and depend on months of smoothly professional television ads to generate the voter following required to win.

It was in recognition of that fact that I wrote the following release, concerning the electoral contest and its outcome:
________________________________________
ELECTION IN HONDURAS -
December 1, 1997

Honduras didn’t have a national election yesterday. It was billed as a national election, but when it happened it turned out to be a raffle.

In a Reuters story (11/28/97) by-lined by Caroline Brothers, the
figure of $13.5 million U. S. dollars was cited as the probable "contribution"
of the drug interests (Columbian and Mexican) to the Honduras election.
My own survey of eight extremely knowledgeable Honduras insiders
generated a consensus figure of between $20 and $25 million. This,
however, this is beside the point.

Taking the "low-ball" Reuters number of $13.5 million consider its                        pragmatic impact on Honduras realpolitik:

The monthly salaries for the top officials in the Honduras government
structure, stated in U. S. dollars, are as follows:

Offices                            Per Month                       Totals per month
President                          $ 5,000.00                       $    5,000.00
Vice-Presidents (3)             2,105.00                             8,076.00
Deputies (128)                    1,197.00                         153,216.00
President Supreme Court   1,197.00                              1,197.00
Supreme Court Justices (9)    845.00                             7,605.00
                                                                               -------------
                                                   (Monthly payroll) $175,094.00

Multiplying the monthly total by 12 (months in a year) gives us an
annual payroll figure for these top officials of US$2,101,128.00.

Multiplying the annual figure by 4 (years in office) comes to a grand
total for the life of the administration of US$8,404,512.00.

Any reasonable person will have to ask, what’s the incentive for
"political contributions" that double or triple this figure? Or that
represent more than $6 for every ballot marked. Especially in a country               where the statutory minimum wage is US$79 a month, and 80% of the                 total population lives in abject poverty.  Injecting this amount of money                into the Honduras election process simply smothers the real business                 that is supposed to be taking place. What can possibly attract this kind               of outside interest in a Honduras national election?

Anyone who doesn’t already have the answer to that question will not
have to wait long to get it. Honduras is on its way to becoming the
principal narcotics trans-shipment point between South America, and
Mexico, the United States and Canada, at least. There is also talk of a
European "pipeline."

To repeat for emphasis, Honduras didn’t have a national election
yesterday. It had some local elections, and a national raffle.

The drug interests have to think they won big. Their confidence is
based on the fact that they had both of the dominant political parties
"bought" long before the first vote was cast. How can you lose a
raffle when you hold all of the tickets?

But they might be in for a huge surprise, because something happened
yesterday that hardly anyone expected:

The nominal "Liberal" candidate, Carlos Flores Facusse, took an early
lead in the balloting and was never challenged by his Nacionalista
opponent, Nora Gunera de Melgar. Moreover, Flores won it while                   putting all of the political distance possible between himself and his                       presumed "supporters" in the "Red" party structure. He did it without                   speeches.   He did it without the time-honored monster barbecues. He                 even did it without media interviews, although he is, himself, the  publisher             of La Tribuna, one of the major newspapers in La Republica de Honduras.

He did it on his own terms!

Disdaining all of the conventional wisdom concerning the importance of              building intra-party ties, as a crucial leg-up on the election, Carlos Flores
"did it his way," and he won. As a result, Honduras now has the first
certifiable "Independent" president in its short and stormy history as
a self-styled Republica.

The quid-pro-quo deals that were made by party leaders to obtain the
millions of dollars pumped in by  outside special interest groups,                           on the face of things, don’t appear to carry the seal of approval of
President-elect Flores. The folks who think they "bought" the Honduras
election may find out that the man who occupies the Presidential Palace
has a different view of things. Stay tuned. This could be interesting!

The  path for a political  iconoclast is never smooth. Don Carlos has his work cut out for him. From the vantage point occupied by this reporter, however, he looks to be equal to the immense demands of  his enormously audacious  undertaking.

However, only time can provide a reliable answer to this question.

                       ------------ E N D -------------

Lorenzo Dee Belveal, Author
Copyright © 1997 Lorenzo Dee Belveal
All Rights Reserved

Guadalajara, Jalisco, MEXICO